

THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

A Monthly Journal of Philosophy

FEBRUARY, 1928

American Character Education

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Cicero's De Finibus

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Twenty Four Hours a Day

An Editorial

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THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

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Twenty Four Hours A Day

 hile St. Thomas taught in the schools of Europe and Louis the Ninth ruled France, man made one of his highest marks on the scale of civilization; and, content though we are with the advantages of the present age, we have reason to glance back at their century and to draw from it many a lesson.

In those days, the young man that entered a profession or a craft understood that he was expected to give himself over to his work and to consider it the great natural purpose of his life. The bishop received him for the Church or the craftsman for the guild, and the first duty of these masters was so to train the boy that he saw all things in the light of his profession and never forgot that he belonged to it. If his lot lay with the clergy, he took on the things of the clergy, and if his choice lay with the guild, the chisel and mallet in his hands were emblematic of the constant singleness of purpose and devotion to duty that ultimately gave birth to the unsurpassed temples of stone.

We see the same attitude in certain professions today; for

example, that of the scientist. The young scientist of promise exhibits a characteristic mark. Others unconcernedly "turn on the light;" he closes an electric circuit and converts one form of energy into another. He dislikes to pass over a fact of nature; it is for him a phenomenon awaiting explanation. A scientist at all is a scientist for life and in every moment of life, and the inquiring frame of mind he hopes to develop, far more than a mere accidental phase or the shadow of a moment, is welded into his very character, a mental spurconstantly urging him to the basic duty of the scientist, inquiry.

Three brothers rule the realms of thought; What, and How, and Why. The first is a youth; the second, a man with the tempered vigor of maturity; the third, a sage, hoary with the wisdom of ages. And every man is bound by the chain of human curiosity to one of these three brothers.

To the brother What, most men owe allegiance; their aim is actual knowledge, and with it they are content. A smaller number, unsatisfied with mere facts, inquire about them, compare them, and thus attain to the service of the second lord, How. They are the scientists. And finally, there are those unresting souls who, striving upward with "Excelsior" held on high, go on to reach the fields of highest endeavors, who are ready to sacrifice their all to learn the answers to that last burning question, deepest of all that agitate the human heart, Why. They are the lords of men, philoaphers.

And we are incipient philosophers.

For the young scientist mounting the hill of knowledge, it is easy to fall short of the goal, to be content with the lighter labor of seeking only the What of things; and many there are who fail to discern the How behind the swinging lamp or the dividing cell, who have failed to acquire the scientific attitude of inquiry to the extent that it serves them as a safeguard against lures that would draw them from their chosen path. But for the aspiring student of philosophy, there are many more chances to halt short of the goal. In addition to all the temptations of the scientist, the very fields of science can hold out to him inducements that, lotus-like, dull his higher aspirations. He must be prepared to go behind the laws of swinging lamps, the rules of dividing cells; he must seek the Why. And if the scientist's work is slow, his is much slower. It is only with great perseverance and constant power of will that he can successfully resist the allurements of the lower levels and finally, worn but triumphant, plant his standard upon the highest peaks of intellectual attainment. And the only natural help is his philosophic attitude.

That philosophic attitude is a constant frame of mind, a determination to grasp things in their essence, their fundamental relations, an undying desire to rise above the What and the How to the Why of things. It is only after he has gleaned the facts and laws of swinging lamps and dividing cells that the philosopher begins his proper work. The brightening of the electric filament, the formation of a bay bar, are more than phenomena to him; they form material upon which to think to the Why of things.

Philosophizing is hard, and it is proportionately easy to give up the practice of it. And we can fail by such imperceptible degrees that we hardly know we have left the height. Why are so many men of learning godless? In their pursuit of that learning, they acquire hosts of facts, they found and strengthen laws, but because they fail to seek the fundamental relations of

American Character Education

By Paul T. Cavanaugh

THE godless public school system, not content with the influence it possesses as School, is slowly usurping the places of Home and Church and is coming to function, not only in its rightful capacity but also as the supreme and only trainer of the young. Thus is St. Thomas' doctrine "De Magistro" subverted. Mr. Cavanaugh's article deals with the School's efforts to give birth to what it does not of itself possess.

THE American Public School is, of course, non-sectarian. In its class-rooms sons and daughters of every variety of believer and non-believer strive on an equal footing for intellectual attainments, physical development and recognized success. All educators, irrespective of their religious affiliations, agree that one of the major objectives in the American school is also the training of character. But training of character - what a divergence of views there is upon just what character is and what elements enter into its makeup, and consequently on how it should be trained. Can we ever even hope to arrive at a universal code of morality which will serve as a basis for the character training of the American child and at the same time be agreeable to all Americans, regardless of their concepts of what character and morality are.

This is the problem which the Character Education Institution at Washington has set before itself. Under the leadership of its chairman, Mr. Milton Fairchild, it is trying to perfect a code of morality first for our primary schools and then another for the High School. Its efforts are worthy of praise, its principles we cannot adopt, for from the point of view of Scholasticism, especially in its ethical aspects, to what errors and half-truths do not their compromises lead them?

"The Children's Morality Code for Elementary Schools" is the one which is now in circulation. This code was awarded the first prize (\$5,000) in the National Morality Codes Competition of 1916, with the appellation "the best children's code of morals". By best, I suppose, is meant that it least injures any of the sensitivities of those whose character training ideals so widely diverge, and which best leaves entirely out of consideration those points upon which they do not all agree. The secondary title of the code is "The Elementary Morality of Civilization. This is the preamble:

Boys and girls who are good Americans try to become strong and useful, worthy of their nation, THAT our country may become ever greater and better. Therefore, they obey the laws of right living which the best Americans have always obeyed.

Then follows a decalogue of laws: the Laws of Self-Control, of Good Health, of Kindness, of Sportsmanship, of Self-Reliance, of Duty, of Reliability, of Truth, of Good Workmanship and of Team-Work. An epitome of the first ten is found in the eleventh, which we shall quote in full as an illustration of the manner in which each of the preceding is developed.

THE LAW OF LOYALTY

Good Americans are loyal

If our America is to become ever greater and better, her citizens must be loyal, devotedly faithful, in every relation of life; full of courage and regardful of their honor.

1. I will be loyal to my family. In loyalty I will gladly obey my parents or those who are in their place, and show them gratitude. I will do my best to help each member of my family to strength and usefulness.

2. I will be loyal to my school. In loyalty I will obey and help each pupil to obey those rules which further the good of all.

3. I will be loyal to my state, my town, my country. In loyalty I will respect and help others to respect their laws and their courts of justice.

4. I will be loyal to humanity and civilization. In loyalty I will do my best to help the friendly relations of our country with every other country, and to give to everyone in every land the best possible chance. I WILL SEEK TRUTH AND WISDOM; I will work and achieve, if I can, some good for the civilization into which I have been born.

If I try simply to be loyal to my family, I may be disloyal to my school. If I try simply to be loyal to my school, I may be disloyal to my town, my state and my country. If I try simply to be loyal to my town, my state and country, I may be disloyal to humanity. If I try above all things else to be loyal to humanity, then I shall surely be loyal to my country, my state, my town, to my school and to my family. And this loyalty to humanity will keep me faithful to civilization.

To the scholastic philosopher the question immediately arises, "What about God?" Well, God is one of those points on which we Americans are not all agreed, so we must not bring that into our "American" morality code. "And, the hereafter?" Of that we have no experience, so we disagree on that too, and consequently give it no mention in the code. "But morality is something that must be determined by a principle or standard. There must be something that determines the goodness or badness of an action; and that can hardly be done without taking God into account." Well, God is the object of religion, and God is the motive used in religious education. The training of our youth in character is distinct from training in religion, though it is an harmonious and proper associate of it. Since our religious views vary so widely and cannot enter - by force of law - into our American schools, we have to seek another motive to present to our children as the guiding force in their moral development and habit formation. The Character Institution expresses this motive:

It is possible to present to the children effectively in simple language the fact that in human civilization the continued life of their own community and Nation and the perpetuity of the culture of humanity are dependent upon the transmission from one generation to another of the ability, character, knowledge and skill which have already been achieved as constituting human civilization. The children can see with their own eyes that

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CICERO'S DE FINIBUS

By James F. Orford

There are grounds for the opinion that Cicero, well known today for his oratorical powers, has been denied his rightful place in the age long chain of philosophers. In the following article, Mr. Orford points out his true position and uncovers the essential points of one of his finest works.

Cicero was not a profound thinker, and, as he himself admitted, did little more than transcribe the Greek philosophies into his own language. Most of his writing on philosophical subjects was achieved within two years. Such a mass of work so rapidly produced could hardly be original; it was really a sort of encyclopaedia of philosophy for Roman readers. He did not even assimilate the thoughts of others and then recast them in the mold of his own mind, but was content simply to reproduce the matter as it was. His contribution to the science of philosophy was philological rather than metaphysical. Neither depth of vision nor scientific insight was his, but possessed however, of a copious and powerful style, he created a philosophical terminology which has passed into the language of modern Europe.

This treatise "De Finibus" is the most pretentious and elaborate of all his philosophical writings, and concerns itself with the theory of ethics. The discussion is cast in the form of a dialogue, and in it are expounded the three great ethical systems in vogue in his day, namely the Epicurean, Stoic and that of the Academy. The book gives quite an adequate exposition of the theories of conduct which held the minds of thinking men at a time when the old religions had deteriorated and Christianity had not yet risen. Cicero considers the question proposed by Aristotle as to the "telos", or ultimate good, of man by presenting the chief views as to the chief good and evil. The disappointing feature of the treatise is that the great orator does not sharply define his own views and we are left somewhat in the dark as to his real convictions. Possibly the truth is that he was something of an eclectic, and chose what he wished from all three.

In the first dialogue the Ethics of Epicurus are expounded and then refuted from the Stoic standpoint. After a short introduction the dialogue opens with Torquatus undertaking the defence of Epicurus. Pleasure, he holds, is the chief good and pain the chief evil. This he proves by the universal instinct to seek the former and avoid the latter. But in man the instinct is qualified and he seeks to secure the greatest balance of good over pain, in the aggregate; He rejects pleasure to secure greater pleasure and endures pain to avoid worse pain. Pleasure and pain, moreover, supply the motives of desire and avoidance, and the springs of conduct in general. This being so, it clearly follows that an act is right in so far as it is a means to pleasure. But that which is not a means, but to which all other things are means, is the "telos"; therefore the chief good is to live pleasantly. Torquatus then considers the virtues and shows that they are all means to pleasure. Finally he explains that control of the passions is the sole way to happiness.

Cicero then proceeds to a criticism of this doctrine, and proposes to adopt the Socratic method. He claims that Epicurus confounded two things under the term pleasure, namely, pleasure in the ordinary sense, and absence of pain, which is quite distinct from pleasure. Absence of pain, Cicero argued, is a neutral state between pleasure and pain. However, Epicurus identified them and frequently defends downright sensualism, provided that it is cautious and refined. And yet self-indulgence is not really happiness at all. Cicero then attacks the argument from instinct and contends that not sense but reason must determine the "telos"; and reason pronounces for virtue. Pleasure cannot account for virtue, and they are explained only by their moral worth, or the value they have in themselves regardless of their utilitarian aspect. In a beautiful peroration Cicero tells us that man is made for higher things than pleasure. The mind, he says, contains an element of the celestial and divine. Hedonism, therefore, must not be allowed to subvert morality.

In the second dialogue Marcus Cato undertakes to explain the Stoic theory of morality. Their formula, their "telos", is "To live in accordance with nature." To substantiate this doctrine they appealed like Epicurus to instinct, but with a different result: Not pleasure, but self-preservation and the things conducive to it, are the object at which even animals and infants aim. This instinct is replaced in the adult by deliberate choice; as his reason matures he learns to understand the plan of nature and to find his happiness in willing conformity with it. This rectitude of the understanding and will is wisdom or virtue, which is the only good; their deordination is the only vice or evil. To prove that moral worth is the only good, the following syllogism is advanced.

Quod est bonum, omne laudabile est.

ATQUI-Quod laudabile est, omne est honestum.

ERGO-Quod est bonum est honestum - that is, morally honorable.

That all moral worth is intrinsically desirable is proven from common sentiment and conduct. Next follows the doctrine that everything save virtue and vice is indifferent, since they contribute nothing to happiness. But of these indifferent things, some are to be preferred as being conformable to nature, others to be shunned as not being so conformable. And thus the only failure or sin is the conduct of a rational creature who ignores or violates nature.

Cicero, again playing the role of critic, declares that the final good must be of such a nature as to satisfy both the body and soul. A creature's good, then, must be something that makes for the good of the "totum." Since virtue does not tend toward the good of the body, every theory that makes virtue the sole good is erroneous. Cicero then attacks the syllogism given above by a negation of the major premise. "O plumbeum pugnionem," he calls the argument. In conclusion he alleges that Stoicism attempts to combine incompatible views.

The last system to engage his attention is that of the old Academy of Antiochus. It is a combination of the old Academic and Peripatetic

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THE GOLDEN CHARIOT

By Marion Ganey

Some pages of Cosmology have the reputation of appearing drab. In his essay, The Golden Chariot, Mr. Ganey undertakes to clothe with interest and imagery the difficult concept of Time, and we feel that his readers will agree that he has been successful.



hat we should build a Golden Coach and name it "Time", is not inconceivable. In the bye-gone days the coach was a receptacle for passengers and luggage and so too may we consider Time a capacity for bearing durable things. The coaches now in use, mostly for chicken roosts, I imagine are necessarily old and so is time.

Besides being old, Time is certainly golden. The authors of platitudes and axioms have dinned that into our ears with the persistency of a press agent. The big chiefs of business are frequently represented as assent-

ing heartily to the maxim, and there is little mercy shown the feelings of a visitor, who overstays his time during the busy hour. Time is a thing of value then; past, present, and future. Our past is a remembrance and a warning, our present is an opportunity, and the future is a hope and promise.

Oh golden hours,--(they are golden, all the great men said so) since we are naming a coach, Time, in your honor, the coach too, must be golden. There we have it a beautiful fourteen karat golden coach, which carries not merely a coachman, a lackey, my lady, and a crest upon the door, but which contains all created things.. On, on it travels, and has been traveling, never altering its speed, never changing its direction. It is a big, old carriage as I have said; very big, and very old; traveling smoothly, and very dusty. It is covered with geological grime of the ages and encrusted with burnt out meteorites. This buggy contains the universe, the seasons, the forms, the colors, the smiles and keenings, living man and his forebear's ashes. There are wars being waged on the floor slats amid the skulls and blunder busses of other wars. There are rich men riding on the cushions, and poor men being ground in the axles. Now warm hands are grasping for wealth, (as children reaching for flowers Brushing the mud-guard). At the next milestone wealth is torn from cold hands, (like mamma, spanking the poison ivy from between her darling's pudgy digits.)

By this time you are aware that sometime during my life I have ridden in a surrey. My memory tells me that it was I in the past. And you too have ridden in "Time" for you too have a past. A past, my friend and when the great, easy running, Golden Chariot comes to the gates of eternity, and when the ashes and dust miles deep on its floor take life, will you rise up then with the great doubters of the ages and try to say, "I am not I. I have no past. Time is not real, for I was not I. I Don't even think I think."

As far as this paper is concerned the golden coach has collapsed. After all it was only an ens rationis. But we must admit, as a concept it had some foundation. That foundation was certainly its movement, and if there was such a carriage moving in this manner we could mark or measure our time from its motion. In fact if we were hard pressed we could measure time from the number

of buttons on the tail of a rattlesnake, or from the rotation of the earth on its axis. It is no exposition of a scientific secret to say that the rotation of the earth on its axis has been selected as the most perfect constant of internal change. This makes it most suitable as a measure of duration. The assumption that the rotation of the earth is a constant is justified because by observation of the moon and planets it has been found that the only possible change in the period of rotation is one one-hundredth ($1/100$) of a second per century. Elgin, or Seth Thomas, or even Ingersoll has yet to construct a timepiece which will equal this in accuracy.

Time is commonly considered as a continuous flow without interruption. Time stops for no man; time is neither quick nor slow, but always uniform. Whereas movements take place in time they do not simply constitute time, for they are interrupted, and they are of variable velocity. Others think differently. Kant says time is an 'a priori' form of internal sensibility. Some hold it is especially the movement of human thoughts one after the other. In so doing it seems that many confuse their concept with their foundation. As for us, we believe with the squirrel, who has memories of a bitter winter, and senses another, that time has reality, and that a Golden Chariot is as good a phantasm as any. Now you can drive.

TWENTY FOUR HOURS A DAY
(Continued from page 68)

things, the essences of objects, because they give no time to the slow, wearying thinking from their knowledge to such elusive concepts as the principle of causality and the First Cause, the upper regions of thought become for them misty, and finally invisible, and they come to themselves with a start in the midst of the sceptical question, "How can there possibly be a God?"

Good men have gone that way. But there are lesser pitfalls menacing all students of philosophy. The desire for speed can easily eclipse our philosophic attitude. Who of us has not caught himself mistaking the memorizing of a thesis for the assimilation of its principles? In the first days of our course, we are tempted to slur the grasping of *comprehensio idearum*. We are unable to say offhand whether the syllogism gives us new knowledge or not. We toy with gigantic concepts, passing from tenth metres to ten metres in the twinkling of an eye. The stars are "quite a ways" overhead, the seventeenth century and the Cambrian age almost coincide, eternity is a long time and infinity a great space.

Ours is a difficult task- to strike the happy mean between these three grades of knowledge and at the same time to keep our allegiance to philosophy through the philosophic attitude. There are times when it takes all our powers to keep from slipping backward, times when we do go back and no mistake about it; but the whole trend of our movement is upward, "Excelsior," headed for those highest fields and our rights to reap the golden harvests that grow in the kingdom of Why.

After all, it is a question of "age quid agis." Aelfric, one of those who prepared the way for the century of Thomas and Louis, puts it succinctly in one of his bilingual textbooks: "Whether you are a priest or a monk, a layman or a soldier, apply yourself to that and be what you are; as it is a shame for a man not to be what he is and what he ought to be."

Common Sense Remonstrates

By John F. Bannon

Mr. Bannon, a philosopher of Maison St. Louis, Isle of Jersey, sends us this lively treatment of the problem of color sensation. Regardless of your own convictions on the subject, we feel that you will finish his paper with a feeling of satisfaction at his explanation of the via media of the question.

More weary with thinking than with walking, I sat down on the tip of a bluff, and continued to wonder why my view of nature had so changed. At last the light came. Until now I had had no thoses about qualitates sensibiles to take the charm and beauty out of things. That was the point; that was why everything seemed the same and yet appeared to lack something. I was regretting that the fields across the river and the picturesque white cliffs in the distance were only so many light waves, diffractions and reflections, and so on. Yes, sure enough, that was the trouble.

I asked myself if all my 'fundamentaliters' and 'formaliters', all my 'id quods' and 'quos' and 'ex quos' were not after all nonsense. Why rob nature of her charms for the sake of solving a philosophical problem which no one here below can explain after all? Why not be sensible and hold the views I had cherished from childhood? Was philosophy's function to alter the world, or simply to explain its inmost workings? However, reason seemed to hold the upper hand and I determined to cling to my lately gained convictions.

A tap on the shoulder and a friendly "Hello, old man" roused me from my philosophical reverie. I turned round and who should be there but my old friend, Mr. Common Sense.

"Hello, old timer. How's yourself?"

"No doubt," remarked my friend, after some small talk, "you are still following the wise counsels I so often gave you."

I hesitated. I honestly did hate to tell him of my resolution so lately confirmed to reject his color explanation; but I did not see any other way out of the difficulty. Then I recalled.

"By the way," I remarked, "I don't believe I ever sent you a copy of the paper I wrote on that matter of common sense last year".

"That's fine," he returned. "Stick to common sense, and you will have no trouble with all those high-sounding new theories that even some of the Scholastics are evolving these days. Say, but isn't the view wonderful to-day? The colors of the leaves are gorgeous. Did you ever see such red ones as those of yonder oak? And look at that yellow maple down near the creek. That reminds me. Have you come to the color problem yet in your psychology course?"

"yes, we finished the treatise about a week ago," I replied. "It's certainly interesting."

"You said it. I suppose there is no need of thinking that you are anything other than a stout supporter of St. Thomas and myself on the question."

"I'm afraid," I answered rather shyly, "that we differ on that point. No sir, I don't agree. St. Thomas' doctrine cannot stand the pressure of modern scientific discovery, so I ---".

"But what," broke in Common Sense, "has science to do with philosophy?"

"That is quite another question," said I, a bit surprised at this attitude. "Let's finish the color problem and then we can discuss the relation of science to philosophy. For the present let me say that no philosopher, least of all the modern philosopher, may ignore the data of modern science. But to get back to our first question. Where is color? You know as well as I do what science says on the subject. The physicist does not hesitate a minute in affirming that color itself has no objective existence, but is simply the response of sensation to the stimulus of light. The only physical difference corresponding to different simple colors is a difference of wave length, red being the longest and violet the shortest of those affecting the eye. Light, therefore, - white light, - by dispersion, interference, reflection, diffraction, and absorption, is broken up into its constituent parts and conveyed with a wave-like motion through the intervening medium to the eye. And there you have color. Now, you'll admit yourself that a conciliation with the Thomistic doctrine is practically impossible. You know what conclusion Pere Geny who tried it, reached. I did hate, I must avow, to break from the Thomistic explanation; but it does not seem able to stand the strain and meet the requirements."

"It doesn't meet requirements!" objected my interlocutor warmly. "Well, then, I'll be pleased to learn what does. As far as I can see there is no other way to save the necessary objectivity unless you follow the old doctrine."

"On that point," I added, "I must once again disagree. You must not mistake the means for the end itself. I gladly admit the need of objectivity, but I am by no means forced to assent to a hypothetical explanation thereof, one that is quite evidently out of date."

"Hypothetical explanation!"

"Yes, hypothetical explanation," I answered. "That's all it is. In its time it was good, splendid, a masterpiece of philosophical speculation; and for many it remains the same even today. But as far as I am concerned---. Well, that's just the trouble with too many of you people,-- you imagine that simply and solely because St. Thomas said this and that, if you don't adopt his opinion you cannot rest assured of your eternal salvation. Now, I have the very highest esteem and love for St. Thomas, but it might be possible that in this matter another explanation can be just as plausible without being less orthodox."

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REVIEWS

THEODICEA sive Theologia Naturalis, auctore
Josepho Hontheim, S.J. - Borden and Co., MCMXXVI.

Once it was customary for the great Scholastics to write huge Summae of some kind or other in either Philosophy or Theology and, then, after years to condense the matter into Summulae for the use of tyros in these respective sciences. Father Hontheim has not departed from this tradition in his nineteen hundred and twenty six edition of his Natural Theology. His eighteen hundred and ninety-three edition of his Institutiones Theodiceae comprised thirty huge chapters extended over eight hundred pages. The limitations of classroom time and methods has caused this great scholar to re-edit his matter on Theodicy and present a very usable text in the science of Natural Theology. The older edition was more a reference book for the professors of this branch than a text for young ecclesiastical students seeing the matter for the first time.

All the important matter has been kept in the new edition; there is the same lucidity and clarity of thought and accuracy in expression as characterized his great contribution to this field of Theodicy in the nineteenth century. If one were given over to the impression that Theodicy is merely a static science, whose subject-matter has not changed since the great scholastics spoke the last words on all its topics centuries ago, then, let that person consult Father Hontheim's new edition on the following three points, the clearer presentation of the concept of God, the discussion on the Axiological Principle, and the treatment of Modernism.

Once the Scholastic philosopher had to do battle on the question "how God Knows"; now, the great problem is how is God known. In this day and age when outside the Church, the thinkers are yearning after the Great Perhaps or the Infinite Maybe, there is strong apologetic need for clarity on the concept of God. Father Hontheim has met this problem in a most admirable fashion. Pragmatism has insisted that philosophers accept the meaningfulness of nature; Father Hontheim has utilized this concession and has established its validity on epistemological grounds and has given the student of Theodicy another powerful weapon in his clearly presented Axiological Principle.

When the Encyclical "Pascendi Dominici Gregis" was revived in the London Times, the Roman correspondent admitted that some subtle scholastic mind had presented the most skillful synthesis of Modernism that had ever been written; in fact, it was the first time that the lay mind could grasp just what Modernism was. The correspondent, then, naively added that the refutation by that same scholastic was not nearly so satisfactory to the poor children of the world as was his presentation of Modernism. The outstanding improvement of the nineteen-hundred and twenty-six edition is Father Hontheim's masterful refutation of Modernism. In ten small topics the problem is thoroughly handled and clearly presented to the student. It is hoped, however, that the older and more comprehensive work will likewise be re-edited as a reference-work and guide in this particular field of Special Metaphysics.

P.F.S.

Milton and Molinism

By Charles F. Kruger

Putting below the verbal forms of literature in search of the deep lying philosophy of the mas is a procedure destined both to deepen and interest the mind. Mr. Kruger has chosen, from the pages of John Milton, a passage provocative of thought in that it links with Molinism the name of this great artist of literature.

TO the Catholic, a representative array of Molinistic and Bannezian names should connote not so much a family quarrel as effects which have their cause in loyal defenses against the attacks of passionate assailants of the family-name. Perhaps the whole matter is worthy of regard in this light, for the idea of a free will has often had bitter opponents outside the pale. However that may be, for the present, we aim to consider the strange paradox of a great Protestant statesman and poet, a Protestant bitter against things at all Catholic, yet who comes so close to Catholic doctrine in the matter of free will

that he seems to be guided by one of the founders of the celebrated doctrines.

John Milton, the puritan poet, "the mighty-mouthed inventor of harmonies", speaks, it is true, with a satanic emphasis of "the Triple-Tyrant", makes the blunder of calling heretics saints, assigns Christ's chosen ones to the Paradise of Fools, and unphilosophically begets in time the Eternal Son of God; yet appears quite able to take a graceful stand along side the Molinists as an unimpeachable defender of human freedom. Surely a paradox; but then, exemption from the stricter laws of logic seems by prescription to be included in the poetic licence.

Milton and Molina - an incongruous pair, to be sure; sworn foe of the "Triple-Tyrant", "eremites and friars", and Molina, the prolix, fatiguing doctor of metaphysics, vowed defender of Christ's vicar; Molina, the priest, the Jesuit. Yet Milton - at least in a noteworthy instance, "skilled to sing of Time or Eternity" - is thus skilled because he follows, at least implicitly, the teachings found within the Church. That instance is found in those lines in the third book of *Paradise Lost*, where, speaking as God the Father addressing the Son, Milton uses his "organ-voice" to sing of the facts the admission of which as true logically requires as a presupposition the teaching regarding God's knowledge of the free future actions of rational beings. It is the passage where Milton describes the fact that God knows these free future acts without at the same time causing them in any way. The passage runs as follows:

Only-begotten Son, -- our Adversary -- wings his way
Not far off Heaven, in the precincts of light,
Directly towards the new-created World
And Man there placed, with purpose to essay
If him by force he can destroy, or, worse,
By some false guile pervert: and shall pervert;
For man will hearken to his glozing lies,
And easily transgress the sole command,
Sole pledge of his obedience: so will fall
He and his faithless progeny.

Note how the poet makes plain the fact of God's knowledge, which follows from the infinite perfection of God; for were the case otherwise, God would not know all truth, and these future acts are truths.

The passage continues:

Whose fault?
Whose but his own? Ingrate, he had of me
All he could have; I made him just and right,
Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall.
Such I created all the Etherial Powers
And Spirits, both them who stood and them who failed;
Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell.

And here we see Milton vigorously asserting the fact that in spite of the foreknowledge on the part of God, man was perfectly free to stand or fall.

And the answer to the objection as thus given, differs from that given by Molina only in the fact that Milton's is art, Molina's not.

Now follows another insistence on the fundamental fact of the doctrine:

They, therefore, as to right belonged
So were created, nor can justly accuse
Their Maker or their making, or their fate,
As if Predestination overruled
Their will, disposed by absolute decree
Or high foreknowledge. They themselves decreed
Their own revolt, not I. If I foreknew,
Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault,
Which had no less proved certain unforeknown.

Even the terminology is Molinistic, as we see in Milton's rejection of any and all absolute decrees on the part of God. And finally he closes the passage with the doctrine stated in a classic rather than syllogistic form. It reads:

So, without least impulse or shadow of fate,
Or aught by me immutable foreseen,
They trespass, authors to themselves in all,
Both what they judge and what they choose; for so
I formed them free, and free they must remain
Till they enthrall themselves: I else must change
Their nature, and revoke the high decree
Unchangable, eternal, which ordained
Their freedom; they themselves ordained their fall.

Little need be added to explain why we infer that Milton, despite his vagaries when he essays the supernatural, attains a higher level in his thoughts on free will. The passage explains, too, Milton's double character of assailant and defendant.

NEWS and ACTIVITIES

PHILOSOPHERS' ACADEMY

Mr. Vincent F. Erbacher read a paper and led a lively discussion on Discipline and Child Psychology at the first February meeting. Discipline in its widest sense, such as the ideal Catholic school exercises, was shown to be the correct way of educating the youth. Pearson's definition, "The process of raising the level of appreciation," was advocated. "He who really appreciates a thing recognizes its intrinsic value," stated Mr. Erbacher. "This recognition of the intrinsic values of things can be brought about only by strict discipline."

FATHER FRANCIS X. DOYLE

It is with deep regret that we record here the death of Father Doyle, Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown. We have lost a staunch friend of philosophy, an eminent lecturer and writer. That his work was watched by those outside the Church may be seen from the fact that his last book, "Defense of the Catholic Church," merited first page recognition in the New York Times Book Review last summer. Father Doyle passed to his eternal reward on Saturday, January 14, at the age of forty-two.

THE SEQUENCE OF PHILOSOPHIC STUDIES

Pontificia Universita Gregoriana
Roma, January 16, 1928

Mr. Howard Morrison, S.J.,
The Modern Schoolman
Dear Mr. Morrison,

Concerning your editorial, "The Sequence of Philosophic Studies," in the Modern Schoolman for December, 1927, it may be of interest to you that the Collegio Angelico, the Dominican college at Rome, has this year introduced a sequence similar to that described in your article. Thus, in the first year of the three year course, Minor Logic and Cosmology are taken; in the second year, Psychology, Ontology, and Ethics; and in the third year, Critica and Theodicy.

Besides this, it has come to my attention that in the colleges and universities of France, in all the courses leading to the baccalaureate degree, a sequence quite different to the traditional order is observed. The philosophic course begins with Psychology, and is followed by Logic, Ethics, and Metaphysics, under which latter term are included Critica, Cosmology, and Theodicy, studied in the order given. This is according to the "Cours de Philosophie" of P. Ch. Lahr, S.J.

Yours fraternally in Corde Jesu,

Cyril O. Vollert, S. J.

OUR CORRESPONDENTS

In a desire to be of service to other scholasticates, the MODERN SCHOOLMAN has asked men in several scholasticates to act as correspondents. We take pleasure in announcing the following men who have agreed to help us: Mr. Raymond C. Blayz, Maison St. Louis, Isle of Jersey; Mr. John C. Rawe, Fairview, Weston, Massachusetts; and Mr. Arthur Gleason, L'Immaculee Conception, Montreal. These men will gladly serve you in the name of the MODERN SCHOOLMAN.

FROM FORDHAM:

"Very many thanks for the last Modern Schoolman. I read every word of it. I believe it is one of the best numbers. I like especially your idea of having study clubs outside of class. Keep it up."

Michael J. Mahony, S. J., Prof. of Philosophy,
Fordham University

THE FOUR A'S.

(From an article by Rev. John Maguire, S.J. in the Fortnightly Review.)

The organization of the Society of Damned Souls at the Baptist University of Rochester two years ago brought before the American people the work of The Four A's., or The American Association for the Advancement of Atheism." To date, they have placed like organizations in twenty large Universities such as California, Chicago, Wisconsin, Texas, Tennessee, and Kansas. The two leading spirits of this propaganda are Charles Smith and Freeman Hopwood. Smith writes editorials for The Truth Seeker," a weekly journal devoted to atheism. Hopwood is ever ready to debate, argue, and to address crowds on "the folly of religion.

According to Smith's statement, there are forty million atheists in this country. "The records," he said, "show that there are more than that in the United States, who are not members of churches, who do not go to church, who do not pray, and to whom God means nothing." asked the number of avowed atheists, he said, "About one hundred thousand. We expect to use them as a nucleus." There are two classes of atheists; those who are satisfied in their own minds that there is no God, but are content to keep their belief to themselves and let others think as they like; the other is the militant atheist who is determined to destroy all religious worship and institute what is known as "Rationalism" which means pure reason and logic. The fountain head of this movement is the Four A's.

"The beauty of it is," says the fiery Hopwood, "That we have so many atheists in the college faculties in America. But of course they can't say much about it, as they would be thrown out, and then where would their living come from? But they encourage the students all they can. As the movement grows, the professors will become more and more open in their private beliefs." Encouragement is given to picturesque names. "The Devil's Angels," is the title of a chapter in Los Angeles. "Why shouldn't they have them?" asks Hopwood. "Atheists haven't long, doleful faces and aren't afraid of a whiskered old man up in the sky somewhere who is going to strike them dead if they don't get names that tickle his vanity. We don't care what they call themselves as long as they knock the fear of God out of the people, and tell the truth about that cess-pool of Asiatic superstition, the so-called Holy Bible."

His hope from the field of science is expressed thus: "A splendid help to us in our work are the scientists of America. We sent out a questionnaire to the scientists of America recently, and we found that 75% are agnostics and atheists."

The "Four A's" have nine objects in view; these they broadcast in all their literature. In brief, they are: 1) All churches shall be taxed. 2) Chaplains in Congress, legislatures, in the army and navy, shall be done away with. 3) Appropriations of public money for sectarian use shall be stopped. 4) The bootlegging (sic) of the Bible and religion into public schools of America shall cease. 5) No religious festival or fast shall be recognized by the State. 6) The Bible shall no longer be used to administer an oath. 7) Sunday as a religious Sabbath shall no longer be enforced by law. 8) Christian morality shall be abolished. 9) "In God we trust" shall be taken off coins.

ethics. The "telos" must be in harmony with our nature and excite appetite. The possible objects of appetite are pleasure, and freedom from pain or natural goods. Man's end therefore, is the perfection of his whole being, the fullest development of his intellectual faculties, likewise health, strength, and beauty of body. However, virtue alone is sufficient for happiness, and external goods merely add completeness. "In the full radiance of virtues they are as invisible as the stars in the glory of the sun."

Against this system Cicero charges serious inconsistency; if misfortunes are evils, can virtue guarantee happiness? Not the greatest, he is told. Then, he replies, it is inconsistent to say that a wise man is always happy, unless it is denied that pain is an evil.

If it is said that happiness cannot include any evil, Cicero answers that a thing is judged by its predominant quality, and that virtue outweighs all else. In teaching that pain is an evil, but must be born with manly fortitude, thus becoming a part of virtue, the Peripatetics, Cicero judges, deserve great credit. He then remarks:

"Sed tempus est, et satis disputatum videtur".

"In America, philosophy has been for some time past in a parlous state. A generation arose that knew not philosophy, but was very desirous of continuing the use of the name. In various forms and with varying degrees of vigour philosophy has been repudiated in quasi-philosophical language. The intellectual sincerity of the expounders of what is called Pragmatism has diverted attention from the fact that Pragmatism is not a philosophy at all, but rather a denial that philosophy can exist. With the title of the New Realism, a group of younger writers and teachers has thought it worth while to repeat with no little ingenuity and to perpetuate, some of the earliest and most thoroughly exposed of philosophical errors."

-Nicholas Murray Butler.

Bertrand Russell tells a story intended as a thrust at old-fashioned reasoning.

A German professor who had received a humorous magazine from a friend was unable to decipher the advertisements.

Finally after much thought and fingering of the snuff-box, the intellectual forms this syllogism and emerges from his quandary.

"This magazine is full of jokes

And- The advertisements are part of this magazine
Therefore - I'm the victim of a hoax.

AMERICAN CHARACTER EDUCATION - Continued

people soon begin to grow old, have to stop hard work and, finally, have to suffer death which ends all of their efforts for their homes, their communities, their nations, and humanity.....A response to the motive of loyalty to human civilization in the sense of trying hard to grow up able to do something real to sustain it, perpetuate it, and mature its culture is natural in the personality of the child..... The teacher will strive, therefore, to be an influential example to the children of the best of American character, and to succeed in convincing the children that the conduct which is right, according to the experience of intelligent people, is so for valid reasons, obligatory on all, and contributive to civilization.

Yes, it is natural for the child to respond to most any motive, command or exhortation presented in an authoritative manner. This is another reason why parents, and the state, too, have a duty to educate children properly. Children will believe implicitly whatever is told them, especially if it comes from those who hold their unbounded confidence. They will accept reasons for things - even insufficient reasons - if they are strongly enough urged upon them. This is natural, though whence come such natural tendencies it is beyond the child to know, for they have not the resources of information or experience by which to judge or form opinions of their own.

Now, take a child who has seriously undertaken to live up to the good conduct outlined by the so-called Elementary Code of Civilization; he has formed habits of good living, and has tried to be loyal to that civilization and humanity presented to him almost as a God, and to be faithful to Uncle Sam, the incarnation of that abstract deity; he comes now to the adolescent age where he begins to think for himself, to decide his own troubles and doubts and to search for wisdom and truth on his own initiative. Is loyalty to civilization a sufficient motive for deterring him from wrong? He sees others in the face of strong temptations and circumstances choosing the easier course. Imitation is still natural to the boy and example is a giant compared with dogmatic instruction. In his heart of hearts are awakening mightier thoughts, indistinct, insistent, perplexing. With his spirit of "loyalty" he is loath to throw overboard his boyhood ideal, "I will be loyal to humanity." But how strange this reality and how different these inner whisperings. "I will seek for truth and wisdom." The poor lad needs guidance. Will he arrive at that Wisdom which is the proper interpretation of the riddle of life?

Somewhere in the world or out of it there is a Supreme Being, more real, more personal than that half mythical, impersonal Uncle Sam, more worthy and more believable than that vague something called humanity. Man has an origin and a destiny, a dignity more noble, more intimate to each individual than the progress of culture and the good of humanity. Humanity itself, and the good of humanity are not the supreme and last end in themselves, but above and beyond there is a Diviner Something to which all this hard earned progress and betterment is tending. There is something more intimate in this desire

we have for happiness, something in life for me of greater value than working silently and unobserved, perhaps even absolutely in vain for that unattainable humanity. That elementary code of civilization has turned topsy-turvy the true state of affairs and literally crushed the truths of supreme importance. The law of loyalty was an unfinished work, a beautiful figure without a head.

Such thoughts are born deep in the soul of youth, they surge in a misty undercurrent of thought and now and then in his reflective hours bubble near the surface. "I will seek for truth and wisdom," From the ruins of that earlier chaos will he be able to find and cling to the Truth?

COMMON SENSE REMONSTRATES - Continued

"Well", said Mr. Common Sense, what solution will you proffer which will both conserve your profession as a Realist and save you from Subjectivism? Honestly, I for one see no need to look for middle paths when the good old traditional one is good enough."

"But," I enquired, "is the traditional one good enough?"

He did not answer, so I kept on: "As I have intimated before, I do not consider that it is; and I have, therefore, chosen the other explanation, Representationalism or Illationismus, as we say in Latin."

We were walking now and had reached a little level stretch whence we could catch a glimpse of the beautiful flat lands to the right.

"There!" I resumed, "Take the multicolored garb of the woods below us. Where is the color? Solely in the leaves? Hardly. In the light and the intervening medium? Yes, to some extent. And finally, is it in me? Indeed it is, much more so even than in the object wherein it is but fundamentally or casually, while it possesses its formal existence in me in so far as I apprehend it."

"And still you claim to escape Idealism?"

"Indeed," I returned, "for my cognitive representation of the reality of which I am immediately and directly aware, this 'species sensibilis expressa' is not only the 'id quod' of the subjectivist, it is rather the 'id quod ex quo', a sort of mental datum from which by a very natural process of inference I attain to a conscious sense knowledge of the outside world. It is, I'll confess, a bit revolutionary; but it solves the question admirably, saving the objectivity of the external world and conciliating scientific data."

So the discussion continued. Mr. Common Sense, not at all satisfied with my explanation, proposed one difficulty after another, criteriological as well as psychological. He kept away from the realms of science, but I with much glee took care of objections from that quarter. Our little debate ended at the parting of the roads. I felt that I had been true to reason; my old friend probably felt that he had been true to common sense.